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CRIMINALIZATION TENSIONS:
EMPIRICAL DESERT, CHANGING NORMS & RAPE REFORM
Paul H. Robinson*
This short Article is part of the organizers’ larger Criminalization Project, which seeks,
among other things, to develop theories for how criminalization decisions should be made. The
argument presented here is that there is instrumentalist, as well as deontological, value in
having criminalization decisions that generally track the community’s judgments about what is
sufficiently condemnable to be criminal, but that there are also good reasons to deviate from
community views. Interestingly, those in the business of social reform may be the ones with the
greatest stake in normally tracking community views, in order to avoid community perceptions of
the criminal law as regularly or intentionally doing injustice. By building the criminal law’s
moral credibility, the law can earn “credibility chips” that the social reformer then has
available to “spend” when the criminal law is needed to help change existing norms. The
strategic dilemmas of a rape reformer are used as a case study to demonstrate the complexities
of the calculations.
_____________________________
Let me begin by putting this discussion in the context of the larger Criminalization
Project of which it is part. That Project considers how criminalization decisions should be made.
One aspect of that question is: Should criminalization decisions be guided by what the
community holds to be morally condemnable? There are at least two separate issues here:
Should criminalization be limited to what is morally condemnable? And should condemnability
be measured by the community's views?
There is an enormous literature on the first issue, of course, including such debates as:
Should the criminal law permit strict liability offenses? Should the criminal law be used to
punish regulatory violations that do not rise to the level of morally condemnable conduct? My
own view, shared by many theorists, would be to set condemnability as a prerequisite for
criminal liability.1 In this paper, I want to focus primarily on the second question: Should the
criminalization decision be guided by community views of what is condemnable conduct (rather
than the views of moral philosophers, for example)?
The first issue – the advisability of constraining criminalization by moral condemnability
– has moved from an academic to a practical issue in the United States. Two years ago, the
American Law Institute amended its Model Penal Code for the first time in the 47 years since its
promulgation. The amendment shifted the Code's distributive principle for punishment from the
traditional "laundry list" of alternative mechanisms of coercive crime control – deterrence,
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incapacitation of the dangerous, rehabilitation – to a distributive principle that set moral desert as
the dominant and inviolable first principle.2
The Model Code does not address the issue of whether desert as a distributive principle
should be based upon a moral philosophy conception of desert, what might be called
"deontological desert," or based upon the community's shared lay intuitions of justice, what has
been called "empirical desert."3 On the other hand, it has been argued that in practice the latter is
more likely to control than the former, if for no other reason than because of the notorious level
of disagreement among moral philosophers about a wide range of, if not all, desert issues, which
makes it difficult to operationalize a notion of deontological desert. In contrast, empirical desert
can be easily and authoritatively determined simply by doing the empirical studies.4
Even if it is empirical desert, rather than deontological desert, that comes to be the
distributive principle for punishment under codes based upon the Model Penal Code, the
deontologists might well be quite happy. It may well be that empirical desert is the closest
approximation of deontological desert that they are ever likely to have adopted in a working
criminal justice system. (And there are some deontologists who would define desert in such a
way as to suggest that empirical desert is deontological desert.5)
Some of us have taken an instrumentalist approach and argued that empirical desert is an
attractive distributive principle for punishment because such a distribution of liability and
punishment in accord with the community's shared intuitions of justice builds the moral
credibility of the criminal justice system and thereby promotes cooperation, acquiescence,
harnesses the powerful social influences of stigmatization and condemnation, and increases
criminal law's ability to shape societal and internalized norms. (Others have argued that
empirical desert is an attractive distributive principle for criminal livability and punishment
because it promotes democratic ideals.6)
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I have written a good deal about this issue and will not repeat the discussions here,7 other
than to suggest that empirical support for this view is growing. The most recent set of studies
show not only that the traditional coercive crime-control doctrines of deterrence and
incapacitation generate sentences that commonly conflict with shared intuitions of justice, but
also that such conflicts undermine the criminal law's moral credibility and, thereby, have
practical consequences that undermine the criminal justice system's crime fighting effectiveness.8
Justifying Deviations from Desert to Change Societal Norms
What I would like to address in this paper are some of the issues, including
complications, that can arise when one adopts empirical desert as one's distributive principle.
Specifically, one can imagine a number of situations in which one would want to deviate from
empirical desert. There are difficulties with justifying deviations from desert for coercive crimecontrol purposes because such deviations undermine the crime control goal sought to be
achieved,9 but there are other interests, such as legality or control of police and prosecutors, that
might call for some deviation from desert.10 At least, there has been some significant history of
this. As discussed elsewhere, some of these deviations are more justified than others.11
In this paper I address a different sort of justification for deviating from desert: using law
to help change existing societal norms. If law always tracks shared community views, then it
becomes difficult, if not impossible, for social reformers to use criminal law to change existing
norms. Drunk driving and domestic violence, for example, are instances in which community
views have changed over the past several decades, in part because criminal law got out in front
of community views rather than simply following them.
However, the point I want to make here is that the social reformers' decision on whether
to urge deviating from community views is not always an easy one. The deviation can have
serious costs to a planned reform program, even as it can have benefits.
Let me use as a case study the situation of rape law reformers. Assume you are a
reformer who believes that men do not take sufficiently seriously the importance of insuring
clear and free consent before having intercourse. You might view current law, and community
views, as problematic because they seem to accept in some ways the attitude of today's typical
young man, who you think is insufficiently sensitive to the importance of clear and free consent.
You might easily conclude that the criminal law's traditionally demanding culpability

7

Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal
Law and Justice Policy, 81 Southern California Law Review 1-67 (2007) [hereinafter
"Implications"]; Paul H. Robinson, Distributive Principles of Criminal Law: Who Should Be
Punished How Much? chs. 8 & 12 (Oxford 2008) [hereinafter "Distributive Principles"]; Paul H.
Robinson, Empirical Desert, in Paul H. Robinson, Steve P. Garvey & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan,
Criminal Law Conversations 29-39 (Oxford 2009); Paul H. Robinson, Geoff Goodwin &
Michael Reisig, The Disutility of Injustice, NYU L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010) [hereinafter
"Disutility"].
8
Disutility, supra note 7.
9
See generally Paul H. Robinson, Distributive Principles, supra note 7, at ch. 8 (2008).
10
Id. at ch. 12.
11
Paul H. Robinson, Michael T. Cahill, Law Without Justice: Why Criminal Law
Doesn't Give People What They Deserve, Parts I and II (Oxford 2005).
3

requirements allow young men's damaging insensitivities regarding consent to continue
unabated.
This is true not only with defining the unconsented-to intercourse offense to require the
higher culpability levels of purpose and knowledge, which give defenses to young men even
when they have not given consent the serious thought that it deserves, but also may be true even
if the offense were defined to require only the lower culpability levels of recklessness and
negligence. The problem is that, at least jurisdictions with Model Penal Code-based criminal
codes, the definitions of recklessness and negligence incorporate existing community standards
by judging the young man's risk-taking or inattentiveness by standards of "reasonableness." That
standard has the effect of relying upon the existing norms that the reformer thinks are so
troubling.
It is not hard to see why the concerned rape reformer might be attracted to a rule of strict
liability as to consent. Giving a defense to young men who have intercourse without consent,
albeit mistakenly, only perpetuates the unacceptable existing norm. If the law is to get serious
about social reform, intercourse without consent ought to be punished in all cases, the reformer
might argue. Once young men understand this, they will have a strong incentive to become
careful about consent.
The Importance of Criminal Law's Moral Credibility to Social Reformers
Unfortunately, I don't think things are so simple for the reformers. The primary problem
is this: It is social reformers, perhaps more than others, who very much need the criminal law to
speak to the community with strong moral authority. If the criminal law is to have sufficient
moral authority to prompt people to rethink their views on what to expect of young men, it must
have earned that moral credibility with those it seeks to influence. Every deviation from desert
perceived by the community incrementally undermines the law's moral credibility.
It is not that a criminal law must be perfect in tracking community views or lose all
credibility. Some deviations from desert will be quickly and easily excused by the community
because they are seen as unavoidable. The criminal law can do only so much in trying to
accurately re-create the facts of a past event, especially in reference to culpable states of mind
that may be difficult to be sure of even at the time. Also, as mentioned earlier, there are other
important societal interests, such as fairness, that may call for deviating from desert. Doing
justice, while it is an extremely important interest to most people, is not the only interest. What
a sophisticated criminal law can do is take every opportunity to build its moral credibility –
building up its store of "credibility chips" – with an eye toward prudently spending those chips
on those special occasions that it judges to be worth the expenditure in order to shift an existing
societal norm.
What guidance can one give the savvy social reformer about how to perform this
balancing act of when to follow community views and when to deviate from existing views to
lead them? First, it would seem appropriate to always try to avoid blatant and serious conflicts
with the community's shared intuitions of justice, that is, to avoid ever producing cases that will
be perceived as instances of the criminal law intentionally doing what will be seen as serious
injustice. That may mean, for example, that strict liability as to consent is a bad idea for the
ultimate success of rape reform. Such a rule would invite serious liability for a mistake that
could not have been avoided even by the most thoughtful person, thereby risking the creation of
defendant martyrs, which will muddy the offender-victim distinction perceived in such cases.
Second, it seems likely that the system ought to, in all other instances, try to track
community views of justice in order to build up its reserve of "moral credibility chips." That is,
it ought to avoid frittering them away with deviations from desert that have little payoff, such as
4

doing what current law frequently does today in deviating from desert to advance general
deterrence when the prerequisites for effective deterrence are not likely to exist.12 The central
point here is that no deviation from desert should be tolerated unless the benefits from it are
clear. Hopefully, the recent empirical work has at least discredited what was the common
wisdom of the past 50 years that deviations from desert are cost free.13
Finally, it makes sense that, when reformers do decide to spend some of their credibility
chips, they do so carefully and thoughtfully. This means "picking your fights." Understand that
one has limited and dearly-earned chips to spend. Don't spend them now if one will regret not
having them for a more important purpose later. In the context of rape reform, for example, this
might mean adopting a culpability requirement as to lack of consent (that is, avoiding strict
liability), but perhaps setting it lower than criminal law might normally. A recklessness or
negligence requirement would avoid the perceived injustices likely to result from a strict liability
standard, and would place at center stage the issue of what the society should reasonably expect
of its young men with regard to assuring full and free consent. Thus, every case litigated in
public would become not an opportunity for hand wringing about the injustice being done to
young men who make honest mistakes, but rather an opportunity to promote the public
discussion about what should be considered "reasonable" in this context.
This does not mean that a few cases will produce a dramatic shift in societal norms.
Norms are glacial – enormously powerful but slow-moving. However, when norms are
successfully shifted, conduct does change, and not just the conduct that is likely to be caught and
prosecuted as a criminal offense. The power of social norms is one that will seep into the
conduct of two people in an intimate setting, about which neither would ever seriously think to
make public, let alone to involve the criminal law. Yet, a changed internalized norm will change
the conduct, which presumably is what the social reformer is seeking.
Limits on and Techniques for Changing Norms
An important caveat remains to be made: not every judgment about wrongdoing is open
to easy modification by social reformers, at least not through techniques that would be permitted
by liberal democracies. (A good deal of modification can be done through coercive
indoctrination techniques that require serious intrusion into and control over a person's life.14)
Our best guess of the intuitions of justice that, as a practical matter, cannot easily be modified
are those on which there is an existing near unanimity as to their central aspects, part of the
“core” of agreement. This core includes aspects of physical aggression and theft.15 Out from

12

Paul H. Robinson, John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science
Investigation, 24 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 173 (2004); Paul H. Robinson & John M.
Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When
Doing Its Best, 91 Georgetown Law Journal 949 (2003); Distributive Principles, supra note 7, at
chs. 3-4.
13
See, e.g., Disutility, supra note 7.
14
See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, The Case of Richard R. Tenneson, Criminal Law Case
Studies 158-159 (West, 4th ed. 2009).
15
Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance & Conflict in Intuitions of Justice,
91 Minnesota Law Review 1829 (2007); Paul H. Robinson, Robert Kurzban & Owen Jones, The
Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice, 60 Vanderbilt Law Review 1633 (2007).
5

this core, however, change is possible, probably including judgements about coercion to
intercourse.
Appreciating the difference between intuitions that can be changed and those that cannot
is important for reformers. First, it avoids a waste of resources in efforts toward an unreachable
goal. (Those who seek to persuade people that they ought not want to punish, for example, are
on a fool's mission.16 Reformers who want real change, rather than just an excuse for fiery
rhetoric, must focus on what is possible.)
Second, savvy reformers can use the unchangeable core for their own purposes, if they
acknowledge it rather than fight it. For example, an effective technique aims toward building up
(or tearing down) the strength of the analogy between the unchangeable core and the norm out
from the core that is sought to be modified. One can see this lesson at work in recent advertising
campaigns, such as of the music industry seeking to reduce the amount of unlawful downloading
of music. (Note the ineffectiveness of the law by itself to change conduct without changing the
underlying norm.) A recent television campaign shows a person sneaking money from the
pocket of a pleasant and hard-working musician. The message: downloading music is just like
pickpocketing. The campaign seeks to build the strength of the analogy between the core wrong
of physical taking without consent and the unlicensed downloading of music.
For rape reformers, the approach may suggest focusing public discussion and education
on the impropriety of coercive pressures for sex – building the analogy between psychological
coercion and physical coercion – and on the harmful effects of intercourse without consent –
building the analogy to assault.
Conclusion
For our larger criminalization project, the argument here is, first, that serious moral
condemnation ought to be a prerequisite for criminalization, second, that for instrumentalist (and
perhaps deontological) reasons the moral condemnation relied upon ought to be that reflected in
community views, not moral philosophy, but that, finally, there can be legitimate reasons for
deviating from community views. Indeed, the most important point here may be that the persons
who ought to be most interested in criminal law normally tracking community views are those
who want to use the moral credibility thereby earned to bring about important changes in societal
norms.
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